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Abstract
We propose a new way to quantify the restrictiveness of an economic model,
based on how well the model fits simulated, hypothetical data sets. The data
sets are drawn at random from a distribution that satisfies some application-
dependent content restrictions (such as that people prefer more money to less).
Models that can fit almost all hypothetical data well are not restrictive. To il-
lustrate our approach, we evaluate the restrictiveness of two widely-used behav-
ioral models, Cumulative Prospect Theory and the Poisson Cognitive Hierarchy
Model, and explain how restrictiveness reveals new insights about them.
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1 Introduction
If a parametric model fits the available data well, is it because the model captures
structure that is specific to the observed data, or because the model is so flexible that
it would fit almost all conceivable data?
This paper provides a quantitative measure of model restrictiveness that can dis-
tinguish between the two explanations above and is easy to compute across a variety
of applications. We test the restrictiveness of a model by simulating hypothetical data
sets and seeing how well the model can fit this data. A restrictive model performs
poorly on most of the hypothetical data, while an unrestrictive model approximates
almost all conceivable data.
What the analyst views as conceivable reflects their ex-ante knowledge or intu-
ition. For example, the analyst might think that everyone prefers more money to
less, or that players are less likely to choose strictly dominated actions. To measure
restrictiveness, we propose that the analyst first stipulates some basic application-
dependent restrictions on the data, and then generates random data sets that obey
these properties. Our measure of restrictiveness, based on the model’s performance
on this hypothetical data, tells us how much the model restricts behaviors beyond
these background restrictions.
We complement the evaluation of restrictiveness, which is based solely on hypo-
thetical data, with an evaluation of the model’s performance on actual data, using
the measure of completeness proposed in Fudenberg et al. (2019). If a model is very
unrestrictive, then its completeness on the real data does not directly speak to its rel-
evance. In contrast, a model that is simultaneously restrictive and complete encodes
important structure.
Our restrictiveness measure can be computed from data without the guidance of
analytical results regarding the model’s implications or empirical content, so it can be
used in settings where there are no analytic results that describe the model’s implica-
tions.1 We provide estimators for restrictiveness and completeness, and characterize
1There are representation theorems for many non-parametric theories of individual choice, and
some analytic results for the sets of equilibria in games, but we are unaware of representation
theorems for the functional forms that are commonly used in applied work.
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their asymptotic distributions and standard errors. We then apply our method and
estimators to evaluate parametric models from two classic settings in experimental
economics: predicting certainty equivalents for binary lotteries and predicting initial
play in matrix games. In each of these domains, these measures reveal new insights
about the models we examine.
In our first application, we evaluate the restrictiveness of a popular three-parameter
specification of Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT), using a set of binary lotteries
from Bruhin et al. (2010). In addition to the reported certainty equivalents, we
generate many hypothetical data sets of certainty equivalents (restricted to satisfy
first-order stochastic dominance). We find that while the CPT is nearly complete, it
is not very restrictive, because it is also able to fit the hypothetical certainty equiv-
alent data quite well, even though it has only three free parameters. This highlights
an important difference between restrictiveness and notions of complexity based on
parameter counts (see Section 2 for further comparison). CPT’s relatively low re-
strictiveness is important to keep in mind when interpreting its striking predictive
performance on real data.
To investigate the role of the parameters in CPT, we next compare the initial
three-parameter specification of CPT to alternative specifications from the literature
that have fewer parameters. We find that using only the two nonlinear probability
weighting parameters approximates the performance of the three-parameter specifi-
cation on actual data, while being substantially more restrictive. These results point
to the importance of the nonlinear probability weighting parameters in CPT.
Our second application is to the prediction of initial play in 3 × 3 matrix games
from Fudenberg and Liang (2019). We evaluate the restrictiveness of the Poisson
Cognitive Hierarchy Model (PCHM) (Camerer et al., 2004) by generating hypothetical
distributions of play and evaluating how well the PCHM fits the hypothetical data.
We find that in contrast to CPT, the PCHM is very restrictive: Most hypothetical
distributions are poorly fit by the PCHM for any parameter values. In contrast, the
PCHM’s performance on the actual data is substantially better than its performance
on the hypothetical data. These findings suggest that the PCHM precisely isolates a
systematic regularity in real behavior.
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We next compare the PCHM with two alternative models: logit level-1, which
models the distribution of play as a logistic best reply to the uniform distribution,
and logit PCHM, which allows for logistic best replies in the PCHM (Wright and
Leyton-Brown, 2014). We find that logit level-1 not only fits the actual data better
than the PCHM, but is also more restrictive. Moreover, logit level-1 performs almost
as well as the more complex logit PCHM on the actual data, and is substantially
more restrictive.
Our measure of restrictiveness provides a new perspective on the problem of how
richly to parameterize a model. Minimizing cross-validated prediction error can help,
as overparameterized models can overfit to training data and perform poorly on test
data. But cross-validation—like other techniques for guarding against overfitting—
tends to favor increasingly flexible models given increasingly large data sets. In con-
trast, our approach supposes an intrinsic preference for more parsimonious models.
As we show, models with a small number of parameters, such as the four-parameter
specification of CPT that we examine, can allow for a large range of behaviors; models
with the same number of parameters (PCHM versus logit level-1) can differ substan-
tially in their restrictiveness. Understanding the range of behaviors permitted by
these models explains how much a model’s success on real data is due to flexibility
and how much is due to specifically tracking regularities present in the data.
2 Related Work
Koopmans and Reiersol (1950) defined a model to be observationally restrictive if
the distributions of observables it allows are a proper subset of the distributions that
would otherwise be possible. Their definition is with respect to an ambient family
of outcome distributions; when this ambient family consists of every distribution, a
non-restrictive theory cannot be refuted from data.2
Selten (1991) subsequently proposed measuring the restrictiveness of a model by
the fraction of possible data sets that it can exactly explain. To compute this mea-
2As Koopmans and Reiersol (1950) points out, a special case of an observationally restrictive
specification is an overidentifying restriction. See e.g. Sargan (1958), Hausman (1978), Hansen
(1982), and Chen and Santos (2018) for econometric tests of overidentification.
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sure, the analyst needs to know which data sets are consistent with the model, which
can be a demanding criterion. This criterion is satisfied in some cases, e.g. evaluating
whether individual choices from budget sets are consistent with maximization of a
utility function (Beatty and Crawford, 2011) and whether individual choices between
certain pairs of lotteries are consistent with expected utility, or one of its general-
izations (Hey, 1998; Harless and Camerer, 1994). However we do not know which
distributions of initial play are consistent with PCHM, so it is difficult to compute a
measure such as Selten (1991)’s for this parametric model.
In contrast, our proposed measure of restrictiveness is based on approximate rather
than exact fit to a model, and we compute the model’s fit numerically. In this respect,
our approach is closer to revealed preference papers that measure the distribution of
the Afriat index. Choi et al. (2007) and Polisson et al. (2020) relax the implications of
expected utility maximization using Afriat’s “efficiency index” as an analog of our loss
function. They then compare the distribution of the efficiency indices of the actual
subjects with the distribution of efficiency indices in randomly generated data. Our
approach is designed to evaluate parametric models, while GARP is nonparametric,
but can be seen as a way of extending a similar idea to other problem domains and
“loss functions.”
Our use of simulated data to evaluate restrictiveness is similar in spirit to the use
of simulated data to evaluate the power of a hypothesis test, as in Bronars (1987)’s
numerical evaluation of a test of GARP proposed by Varian (1982), but it is not
linked to hypothesis testing. We also provide statistical estimators for our proposed
measures and standard errors for these estimates. These results tell us, for example,
how many hypothetical data sets need to be generated in order to achieve a given
level of approximation to our measure of restrictiveness.
Our work complements the representation theorems of decision theory, which de-
scribe the empirical content of different models. Currently, there are no represen-
tation theorems for many parametric economic models (including commonly-used
parameterizations of Cumulative Prospect Theory and the Poisson Cognitive Hierar-
chy Model). For example, although there are theorems that characterize which data
are consistent with a general Cumulative Prospect Theory specification (Quiggin,
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1982; Yaari, 1987), we know of no representation theorems for the popular functional
form we use here. Moreover, even if a representation theorem is available, it can be
computationally challenging to determine whether a given data set is consistent with
the characterization.3
Our paper is also related to the vast literature in statistics and econometrics on
model selection, which dates back to Cox (1961, 1962). Unlike classic measures, in-
cluding AIC and BIC, restrictiveness is not based on observed data, and it is not
designed to guard against overfitting. Instead, it proposes a practical procedure for
evaluating the restrictiveness of a parametric modeling class within a class of permissi-
ble models.4 Similarly, although VC dimension—which provides another measure for
the “span” of a model—is related to our restrictiveness measure at a high level, it is
generally nontrivial to determine the VC dimension of any given model.5 In contrast,
our metric is (by design) easy to compute. Finally, to derive standard errors for our
estimator for completeness, the paper utilizes a recent development in the statistics
literature (Austern and Zhou, 2020) on the asymptotic theory of the cross-validation
risk estimator.
3 Approach
3.1 Preliminaries
Let X be an observable (random) feature vector taking values in a finite set X , and
Y be an observable random outcome variable taking values in a finite-dimensional set
Y . We use P ∗ to denote the joint distribution of (X, Y ), P ∗X to denote the marginal
distribution of X and P ∗Y |X to denote the conditional distribution of Y given X.
We assume that the marginal P ∗X is known to the analyst, while the conditional
3For example, the Harless and Camerer (1994) exercise would be much harder on larger menus of
binary lotteries, on 3-outcome lotteries, or if subjects had been asked to report real-valued certainty
equivalents.
4This paper has a different goal than the extensive econometric literature that studies how the
“restrictiveness” of an econometric model may affect the identification of parameters and the effi-
ciency of estimators.
5The VC dimension is known for very few economic models. A recent exception is the work of
Basu and Echenique (2020) for various models of decision-making under uncertainty.
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distribution is not.6
The analyst wants to learn a function of the conditional distribution, s(P ∗Y |X=x) ∈
S, where S is finite-dimensional. We call any function f : X → S a predictive map-
ping, or simply mapping, and denote the true mapping f ∗ by f ∗(x) := s(P ∗Y |X=x).
The set of all possible mappings is denoted by F .
We focus on two leading cases of this problem whose structure makes our methods
easier to explain; Section 7 explains how to extend our approach to more general
problems.
Prediction of a Conditional Expectation. When the statistic of interest is
EP ∗ [Y | X], the analyst’s objective is to learn the average outcome for each real-
ization of X. To evaluate the error of predicting f(x) when the realized outcome is
y, we use squared loss l (f, (x, y)) := (y − f(x))2. The expected error of a mapping
f is then eP ∗ (f) = EP ∗
[
(Y − f(X))2] , which is minimized by the true mapping
f ∗ (x) = EP ∗ [Y |X = x]. We show in Appendix A that the difference between the
error eP ∗(f) of an arbitrary mapping f ∈ F and the best possible error eP ∗(f ∗) is
dMSE(f, f
∗) := eP ∗(f)− eP ∗(f ∗) := EP ∗X
[
(f ∗ (X)− f (X))2] , (1)
i.e. the expected mean-squared difference between the predicted outcomes.
Our first application, predicting the average reported certainty equivalent for
binary lotteries, is an example of this case. Each lottery is described as a tuple
x = (z, z, p), and the feature space X consists of the 50 tuples associated with lotter-
ies in a data set from Bruhin et al. (2010). The outcome space of certainty equivalents
is Y = R, and we seek to predict the population average of certainty equivalents for
each lottery x ∈ X . A predictive mapping for this problem specifies an average
certainty equivalent for each of the 50 binary lotteries.
Prediction of a Conditional Distribution. Here the statistic of interest is P ∗Y |X ,
so the analyst’s objective is to learn the conditional distribution itself. To evaluate
6For example, in a decision theory experiment the experimenter knows the distribution over
menus that the subjects will face.
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the error of predicting the distribution f(x) when the realized outcome is y, we use
the negative (conditional) log-likelihood l (f, (x, y)) := − log f (y|x). The expected
error of mapping f is eP ∗ (f) = EP ∗ [− log f (Y |X)] , which is minimized by the true
conditional distribution f ∗(x) = P ∗Y |X(x). As we show in Appendix A, the difference
between the error of an arbitrary mapping f ∈ F , eP ∗(f) and the best possible error,
eP ∗(f
∗), is
dKL(f, f
∗) := eP ∗(f)− eP ∗(f ∗) := EP ∗X
[∑
y
f (y|x) [log f (y|x)− log f ∗ (y|x)]
]
,
(2)
i.e. the expected Kullback-Liebler divergence between f and the true distribution.
Our second application, predicting initial play in in matrix games, is an example of
this case. Here the feature space X consists of the 466 unique 3×3 matrix games from
Fudenberg and Liang (2019), each described as a vector in R18. The outcome space
is Y = {a1, a2, a3} (the set of row player actions) and the analyst seeks to predict
the conditional distribution over Y for each game, interpreted as choices made by a
population of subjects for the same game. Thus, S = ∆(Y), the set of all distributions
over row player actions. A predictive mapping is any function f : X → S taking the
466 games into predicted distributions of play.
3.2 Restrictiveness
Our goal is to evaluate the restrictiveness of parametric models FΘ = {fθ}θ∈Θ ⊆ F ,
where the permitted mappings fθ are indexed by a finite dimensional parameter θ
and Θ is a compact set. If the model FΘ contains a mapping that can approximate
the predictions of the true mapping f ∗, then inff∈FΘ eP ∗(f) also approximates the
true mapping’s error, eP ∗(f). Given enough data, such a model will predict about
as well as possible, but a good fit to the data could be because the model includes
the “right” regularities, or because it is simply flexible enough to accommodate any
pattern of behavior (i.e. FΘ includes most mappings).
Our strategy to determine the restrictiveness of a model is to generate random
mappings f from a primitive distribution µ. In our applications below, we choose µ
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to be uniform over a set FM ⊆ F of “permissible mappings,” which encodes prior
knowledge or intuition about the setting. For example, when predicting certainty
equivalents for lotteries, we may assume that people prefer more money to less.
We treat both FM and µ as primitives. In a sense, their role is analogous to
the choice of what alternatives to consider when computing the power of a statistical
test. In both cases, the right choice is guided by intuition and prior knowledge, and
not derived from formal considerations.7 For this reason, it can be instructive to
compute restrictiveness with respect to different choices of µ—including those that
have support on different permissible sets FM—as we do in Appendix B.2.
We then evaluate how well the generated mappings can be approximated using
the model FΘ. When predicting conditional expectations, we define d : F × F → R
to extend dMSE (as given in (1)) to
dMSE(f, f
′) := EP ∗X
[
(f ′ (X)− f (X))2
]
.
When predicting a conditional distribution, we define d to extend dKL (as given in
(2)) to
dKL(f, f
′) : EP ∗X
[∑
y
f (y|x)
[
log f (y|x)− log f ′ (y|x)
]]
.
Since our subsequent statements hold for both of these functions, we simply use
the notation d, understanding that it means dMSE for predicting the conditional
expectation, and dKL for predicting the conditional distribution.
The model’s approximation error to a generated mapping f is then d(FΘ, f) :=
infθ∈Θ d(fθ, f). We normalize this raw error relative to a benchmark naive mapping
fnaive ∈ FΘ chosen to suit the problem. We interpret the naive mapping as a lower
bound that any sensible model should outperform. For example, in our application
to predicting initial play in games, we define the naive mapping to predict a uniform
distribution of play in every game. Normalizing relative to a naive benchmark re-
7Thus the choice of the distribution of simulated data is related to the choice of what alternatives
to consider when evaluating the power of a test. We note that in many settings where a “correct”
distribution does not exist, uniform distributions are used as a default. For example, in computa-
tional complexity, the average-case time complexity of an algorithm measures the amount of time
used by the algorithm, averaged over all possible inputs (Goldreich and Vadhan, 2007).
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turns a unit-free measure of approximation, which is easier to interpret. (See further
discussion in 3.4.)
Definition 1. The f -discrepancy of model FΘ is
δf :=
d(FΘ, f)
d(fnaive, f)
.
Since fnaive is assumed to be an element of FΘ, the f -discrepancy of FΘ is bounded
above by 1, and since d is nonnegative, the f -discrepancy is also bounded below by
zero. Thus, the f -discrepancy in any problem must fall between 0 and 1. Large
values of δf imply that the model does not approximate f much better than the
naive mapping does. Since the naive mapping itself has no free parameters and
therefore does not have the flexibility accommodate most mappings, concentration
of the distribution of δf around large values implies that the model rules out many
kinds of regularities.
The restrictiveness of model FΘ is its average f -discrepancy.
Definition 2. The restrictiveness of model FΘ is r := Eµ [δf ] .
If FΘ = FM (so that the model is completely unrestrictive), then r = 0 for every
choice of µ with support on FM .
3.3 Completeness
While restrictive models are desirable, a restrictive model is not particularly useful
if it fails to predict real data. We would like models to embody regularities that are
present in actual behavior, and rule out conceivable regularities that are not. We
thus evaluate models from the dual perspectives of how restrictive they are and how
well they predict actual data. The latter can be measured using the f ∗-discrepancy
of the model, where f ∗ is the true mapping. This measure is tightly linked to the
notion of completeness introduced in Fudenberg et al. (2019).
Definition 3 (Fudenberg et al., 2019). The completeness of model FΘ is
κ∗ :=
eP ∗(fnaive)− eP ∗(FΘ)
eP ∗(fnaive)− eP ∗(f ∗) ,
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where eP ∗(FΘ) := infθ∈Θ eP ∗(fθ).
Completeness is the complement of the f ∗-discrepancy, since
κ∗ = 1− eP ∗(FΘ)− eP ∗(f
∗)
eP ∗(fnaive)− eP ∗(f ∗) = 1−
d(FΘ, f ∗)
d(fnaive, f ∗)
= 1− δf∗ . (3)
A model’s completeness can be interpreted as the ratio of the reduction in error
achieved by the model (relative to the naive baseline), compared to the largest achiev-
able reduction. By construction, the measure κ∗ is scale-free and lies within the unit
interval. A large κ∗ suggests that the model is able to approximate the real data well:
at the extremes, a model with κ∗ = 1 matches the true mapping f ∗ exactly, while a
model with κ∗ = 0 is no better at matching f ∗ than the naive model. We will report
both restrictiveness r and completeness κ∗ for each of the models that we consider.
3.4 Discussion of Measures
An alternative “area” measure. Selten’s area measure of model flexibility is
a := µ(FΘ), where µ is the Lebesgue measure, i.e. the fraction of possible mappings
that are exactly consistent with the model. Our measure of restrictiveness differs
both by normalization with respect to the performance of a naive model, and by
measuring how well the model FΘ approximates a randomly drawn mapping f in
FM, which allows us to quantify the degree of error. A model that does not include
most mappings from FM would be considered highly restrictive under the Selten
measure, but would have low restrictiveness by our measure if it approximated most
mappings very well.
Role of the normalization. We define restrictiveness to be the average value
of d(FΘ, f)/d(fnaive, f), rather than its un-normalized counterpart d(FΘ, f). Nor-
malizing relative to a naive mapping has several advantages compared to the unit-
dependent raw error d(FΘ, f): If we were to scale up the payoffs in the binary lotter-
ies in our first application, then d(FΘ, f) would mechanically scale up as well, even
though the flexibility of the model has not changed, which makes it hard to say what
constitutes a “large” value of d(FΘ, f). Normalizing relative to the naive error returns
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a unitless quantity that is easier to interpret, and can more easily be compared across
problems that use different error metrics.
Sensitivity to µ. We might prefer that the restrictiveness measure does not respond
too sensitively to small changes in µ. We demonstrate now that it does not. For any
two measures µ, µ′ ∈ ∆(F),
Eµ [δf ]− Eµ′ [δf ] ≤
∫
δf · |dµ− dµ′| ≤ 2 · dTV (µ, µ′), (4)
where dTV is the total variation distance. Thus for any two measures that are close in
total variation distance, the corresponding restrictiveness measures must also be close.
We complement this theoretical bound with a numerical sensitivity check in Section
5.2, where we evaluate restrictiveness with respect to beta distributions that are close
to our specification that µ is uniform. The resulting variation in restrictiveness is
quite small.
Combining κ∗ and r. Ideal models have high κ∗, so they approximate the real data
well, but also high restrictiveness r, so they rule out regularities that could have been
present but are not. These two criteria generate a partial order on models; there are
many ways to complete it. One possibility is to use a lexicographic ordering, where
models are ordered first by κ∗ and then by r. Another is to impose a functional
form that combines κ∗ and restrictiveness r, such as r − (1 − κ∗) = Eµ[δf ] − δf∗ .8
Yet another possibility is to use the probability that the model fits the actual data
better than it fits a randomly generated data set, namely the quantile of δf∗ under the
distribution of f -discrepancies. In the present paper, we report κ∗ and r separately,
and leave it to the analyst’s discretion whether or how to combine these two metrics.
Point-Identified and Set-Identified Models. Note that f -discrepancy, restric-
tiveness, and completeness are well-defined regardless of whether the parametric
model FΘ is point-identified or set-identified. This is because the definitions of
8Selten (1991) provided an axiomatic characterization of the similar aggregator m = r−a, where
r is the pass rate of the model on the actual data and a is the area measure we discussed above.
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d(FΘ, f), restrictiveness, and eP ∗(FΘ) do not rely on the uniqueness of the mini-
mizers. In other words, we evaluate the parametric model FΘ with d and eP ∗ , so our
measures do not differentiate point-identified models from set-identified models that
yield the same d(FΘ, f) and eP ∗(FΘ).
4 Estimates and Test Statistics
We now discuss how to implement our approach in practice.
4.1 Computing Restrictiveness r
We provide an algorithm for computing r: Sample M times from the distribution
µ on FM, and for each sampled fm ∈ FM, compute δm := d(FΘ,fm)d(fnaive,fm) . The sample
mean δM :=
1
M
∑M
m=1 δm is an estimator for restrictiveness. In principle, the number
of simulations we run, M , can be taken as large as we want, so δ can be made
arbitrarily close to r by the Law of Large Numbers. Moreover, the approximation
error under a given finite M can be quantified using standard statistical inference
methods. We focus on the case where the distribution of δm is nondegenerate.
Assumption 1. The distribution of δm is non-degenerate.
Assumption 1 is a very mild condition that can be easily verified, as it is sufficient
for any two δm and δ
′
m to be distinct.
The sample variance is
σˆ2δ :=
1
M
M∑
m=1
(
δm − δM
)2
, (5)
and the standard Central Limit Theorem gives the following result.
Proposition 1. Under Assumption 1,
√
M
(
δM − r
)
σˆδ
d−→ N (0, 1) .
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The (1− α)-th confidence interval for r is given by[
δM − q1−α/2 · 1√
M
σˆδ, δM − qα/2 · 1√
M
σˆδ
]
,
where σˆδ is given in (5).
One-sided hypothesis tests on r, e.g. for the null that r = 0 so the model is
completely unrestrictive, can also be carried out in standard ways. We again note
that the confidence intervals here simply measure the approximation error of r based
on a finite number of simulations and do not reflect randomness in experimental data.
4.2 Estimating Completeness κ∗
In this section, we show how to estimate completeness, κ∗.
Suppose that the analyst has access to a finite sample of data {Zi := (Xi, Yi)}Ni=1
drawn from the unknown true distribution P ∗. To estimate completeness, we use K-
fold cross-validation to estimate the out-of-sample prediction error of the model. (In
our applications, we take the standard choice of K = 10.) Specifically, we randomly
divide ZN into K (approximately) equal-sized groups. To simplify notation, assume
that JN =
N
K
is an integer. Let k (i) denote the group number of observation Zi, and
for each group k = 1, ..., K, define
fˆ−k := arg min
f∈F
1
N − JN
∑
k(i) 6=k
l(f, Zi)
to be the mapping from F˜ that minimizes error for prediction of observations outside
of group k. This estimated mapping is used for prediction of the k-th test set, and
eˆk :=
1
JN
∑
k(i)=k
l
(
fˆ−k, Zi
)
is its out-of-sample error on the k-th test set. Then,
CV (F) := 1
K
K∑
k=1
eˆk
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is the average test error across the K folds. This is an estimator for the unobservable
expected error of the best mapping from class F .
Setting F˜ to be FΘ, F , or Fnaive = {fnaive}, we can compute CV (FΘ), CV (F)
and CV (Fnaive) from the data, leading to the following estimator for κ∗:
κˆ∗ =
CV (FΘ)− CV (F)
CV (Fnaive)− CV (F) .
It is crucial that the denominator in κˆ∗ does not vanish asymptotically, so we impose
the following assumption:
Assumption 2 (Naive Rule is Imperfect). e (fnaive)− e (f ∗) > 0.
This assumption is quite weak, as it simply says that the naive mapping performs
strictly worse in expectation than the best mapping. Under additional technical
conditions, we show, by applying and adapting Proposition 5 in Austern and Zhou
(2020), that δˆ∗ is asymptotically normal. See Appendix C for details.
To obtain the standard error, we use a variance estimator adapted from Proposi-
tion 1 in Austern and Zhou (2020). Specifically, for the k-th test set, let fθˆ−k and fˆ
−k
be the estimated mappings from models FΘ and F , respectively. The difference in
their test errors on observation Zi is ∆(Zi) = l(fθˆ−k , Zi)− l(fˆ−k, Zi), and the average
difference across all observations in test fold k is
∆k =
1
JN
∑
k(i)=k
∆(Zi).
The sample variance of the difference in test errors is
σˆ2
∆,k
=
1
JN − 1
∑
k(i)=k
(
∆(Zi)−∆k
)2
.
Based on this, we define the following variance estimator for κˆ∗:
σˆ2κˆ∗ :=
1
K
∑K
k=1 σˆ
2
∆,k
[CV (fnaive)− CV (F)]2
. (6)
We establish the asymptotic distribution of our proposed estimators via the following
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theorem.
Theorem 1. Under Assumption 2 and some regularity conditions,9
√
N (κˆ∗ − κ∗)
σˆκˆ∗
d−→ N (0, 1) .
Consequently, the (1− α) two-sided confidence interval for κ∗ is given by[
κˆ∗ − q1−α/2 · 1√
N
σˆκˆ∗ , κˆ
∗ − qα/2 · 1√
N
σˆκˆ∗
]
,
where σˆκˆ∗ is given in (6).
5 Application 1: Certainty Equivalents
5.1 Setting
Our first application is to predicting certainty equivalents for a set of 25 binary
lotteries from Bruhin et al. (2010). Each lottery is described as a tuple x = (z, z, p),
where z > z ≥ 0 are the two possible prizes, and p is the probability of the larger
prize z. (See Appendix B.1 for our analysis of the Bruhin et al. (2010) lotteries in
the loss domain, which is qualitatively very similar.) The feature space X consists of
the 25 tuples associated with lotteries in the Bruhin et al. (2010) data. The outcome
space is Y = R. Each observation in the data is a pair consisting of a lottery and
a reported certainty equivalent by a given subject. Note that the variation in Y for
fixed X reflects the fact that different subjects report different certainty equivalents
for the same lottery. (In Appendix B.5, we discuss how to extend our approach to
allow for subject-level heterogeneity.
We seek to predict the average of the certainty equivalents (over subjects) reported
for each lottery. A mapping for this problem is any function f : X → R from the
25 lotteries to predicted average certainty equivalents. We define d(f, f ′) to be the
expected mean-squared distance between the two mappings’ predictions, as in (1).
9See Appendix C for details of these assumptions.
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The economic model that we evaluate is a three-parameter version of Cumulative
Prospect Theory indexed by θ = (α, γ, η) ∈ R+ × R+ × R+, which predicts
fθ(z, z, p) = w(p)v(z) + (1− w(p))v(z)
where
v(z) = zα (7)
is a value function for money, and
w(p) =
ηpγ
ηpγ + (1− p)γ (8)
is a probability weighting function.10 We specify FΘ as the set of all such functions
fθ, and refer to this model simply as CPT. As a naive benchmark, we consider the
function fnaive that maps each lottery into its expected value, corresponding to α =
γ = η = 1 in CPT.
CPT is 95% complete for predicting this data,11 so the model achieves almost all
of the possible improvement in prediction accuracy over the naive baseline.12 (Equiv-
alently, the estimated f ∗-discrepancy of this model is 0.05.) One explanation is that
CPT is a very good model of risk preferences; another possibility is that the model
is flexible enough to mimic most functions from binary lotteries to certainty equiva-
lents. These explanations have very different implications for how to interpret CPT’s
empirical success.
5.2 Restrictiveness
To distinguish between these explanations, we now compute CPT’s restrictiveness.
Our primitive distribution µ is a uniform distribution over the set of all mappings
10This parametric form for w(p) was first suggested by Goldstein and Einhorn (1987) and Lat-
timore et al. (1992). Following Bruhin et al. (2010) and much of the literature, we will estimate
separate values of these parameters for losses (see Appendix B.1, so in a sense the “overall CPT
model” has 6 parameters.
11 CV (Fnaive)−CV (FΘ)
CV (Fnaive)−CV (F) =
98.32−63.75
98.32−61.87 = 0.95. A similar result was reported in Fudenberg et al.
(2019) for the pooled sample of gain-domain and loss-domain lotteries.
12This finding is consistent Peysakhovich and Naecker (2017)’s result that CPT approximates the
predictive performance of lasso regression trained on a high-dimensional set of features.
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satisfying the following criteria:13
1. z ≤ f(z, z, p) ≤ z
2. if z ≥ z′, z ≥ z′, and p ≥ p′ then f(z, z, p) ≥ f(z′, z′, p′)
3. if z ≥ z, p ≥ p′, then f(z, z, p) ≥ f(z, z, p′)
Constraint (1) requires that the certainty equivalent is within the range of the pos-
sible payoffs, while constraints (2) and (3) require f to respect first-order stochastic
dominance. Note that in the Bruhin et al. (2010) lottery data, there are many pairs
of lotteries that can be compared via (2) and (3), so these conditions are not vacuous.
Below we plot the distribution of f -discrepancies for 100 random mappings f .
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Figure 1: Distribution of f -discrepancies for 100 randomly generated mappings f
The restrictiveness of the model (i.e. the average f -discrepancy) is 0.29, so on
average CPT’s approximation error is less than a third of the error of the naive
(expected-value) mapping. Thus CPT is quite flexible, as it rules out very few regu-
larities that are not already restricted by first-order stochastic dominance.
CPT’s restrictiveness suggests an explanation of its completeness that is interme-
diate to the two explanations proposed above: CPT is quite flexible, as its average
completeness is 71% on the hypothetical data, but it is even more complete on the
real data (95%). Taking both measures into account via a composite such as the dif-
ference (r−δf∗), CPT’s high completeness on real data somewhat compensates for its
13This uniform distribution is well-defined since FM is a bounded subset of R50.
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moderately high completeness on hypothetical data, so we conclude that it encodes
some—but not very much—structure beyond first-order stochastic dominance.
The restrictiveness measure depends on the choice of distribution µ, which we
chose to be uniform. The uniform distribution is the same as beta(1, 1), so to test the
sensitivity of the restrictiveness measure we consider nearby beta(a, b) distributions,
with parameters (a, b) sampled from a uniform distribution over [0.9, 1.1]× [0.9, 1.1].
For each (a, b) pair, we generate certainty equivalents from a beta(a, b) distribution
over the prize range, again keeping only those functions f that satisfy FOSD. Over
100 such distributions beta(a, b), the average restrictiveness is 0.30, with a min value
of 0.17 and a max value of 0.41. Thus our finding that CPT is quite flexible is robust
to these perturbations in µ.14
Next, in Appendix B.2, we compute the restrictiveness of the model with respect
to a different background constraint, dropping the FOSD restrictions in (2) and (3)
while keeping the range restriction in (1). We would expect the restrictiveness of
CPT to increase in this case, since (for all parameter values) CPT obeys first-order
stochastic dominance. We find however that the restrictiveness of CPT relative to
this larger permissible set, 0.35, is only slightly higher than the restrictiveness of 0.29
that we find for the main specification of FM.15 This reinforces our finding that CPT
is not very restrictive.
Our analysis so far leaves open the possibility that the flexibility of the 4-parameter
CPT model is specific to the domain of binary lotteries. In Appendix B.4, we evaluate
the restrictiveness of CPT on a set of 3-outcome lotteries from Bernheim and Sprenger
(2020). We find that CPT is indeed more restrictive on this domain, but still quite
flexible: Its restrictiveness on these lotteries is 0.50. In particular, CPT is much less
restrictive than the models of initial play that we study in Section 6.
14The variation in restrictiveness is bounded by the total variation distance between the primitive
choices of µ (see (4)), but it can be difficult to compute the total variation distance between complex
choices of µ.
15Normalization plays an important role here: CPT’s errors are substantially higher when we drop
FOSD, but so are the errors of the naive benchmark (Expected Value). CPT’s relative performance
compared to the naive benchmark is comparable, whether or not we impose FOSD.
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5.3 Comparing Models
One way to evaluate the value of additional parameters is to compare the increase
in completeness that they permit, relative to the decrease in restrictiveness. As an
illustration, we compare the three-parameter specification of CPT with more restric-
tive special cases that have been studied in the literature: η = 1, as in Tversky
and Kahneman (1992), α = 1, which corresponds to a risk-neutral CPT agent whose
utility function over money is u(z) = z but exhibits nonlinear probability weighting,
and η = γ = 1, which corresponds to an Expected Utility decision-maker whose util-
ity function is as given in (7). We refer to these models respectively as CPT(α, γ),
CPT(γ, η), and CPT(α), where models are associated with their free parameters. We
refer to the original three-parameter specification of CPT as CPT(α, η, γ). The dis-
tributions of f -discrepancies under these more restrictive models are shown in Figure
2 below.
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Figure 2: Comparison of distributions of f -discrepancies.
Less general specifications are always at least weakly more restrictive, but the
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restrictiveness of a model must be considered jointly with its ability to explain the
actual data. Table B.1 reports restrictiveness and completeness for all four specifica-
tions of CPT, and Figure 5.3 plots these measures.
Free Parameters Completeness κ∗ N Restrictiveness r M
α, γ, η 0.95 8906 0.29 100
(0.01) (0.02)
α, γ 0.84 8906 0.43 100
(0.05) (0.02)
γ, η 0.91 8906 0.49 100
(0.02) (0.01)
α 0.18 8906 0.81 100
(0.08) (0.02)
Table 1: Completeness and restrictiveness for each model in the certainty equivalent
setting. N is the number of observations in the data used to estimate κ∗. M is the
number of generated mappings from FM for computation of r.
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Figure 3: Comparison of models
We find that CPT(η, γ), which uses only the nonlinear probability weighting pa-
rameters η and γ, achieves a higher completeness than CPT(α, γ), and does so despite
being more restrictive. This suggests to us that it is a better model of risk prefer-
ences. Adding the risk-aversion parameter α to the nonlinear probability weighting
parameters η and γ leads to only a slight improvement in completeness (κ∗ increases
20
from 0.91 to 0.95), but results in a substantial drop in restrictiveness (r falls from
0.49 to 0.29). This suggests that the probability weighting parameters η and γ are
more useful than the utility curvature parameter α. (These qualitative comparisons
also hold when we consider lotteries on the loss domain, see Appendix B.1.) Our
finding is consistent with previous studies which find that probability distortions play
an important role in explaining field data (Snowberg and Wolfers, 2010; Barseghyan
et al., 2013), and adds a perspective on how much flexibility these parameters intro-
duce. The model CPT-(α) is less complete, but more restrictive than CPT-(η, γ), so
these two models cannot be directly ranked.
6 Application 2: The Distribution of Initial Play
6.1 Setting
Our second application is to predicting the distribution of initial play in games. Here
the feature space X consists of the 466 unique 3 × 3 matrix games from Fuden-
berg and Liang (2019),16 each described as a vector in R18. The outcome space is
Y = {a1, a2, a3} (the set of row player actions) and the analyst seeks to predict the
conditional distribution over Y for each game, interpreted as choices made by a pop-
ulation of subjects for the same game. Thus, S = ∆(Y), the set of all distributions
over row player actions. A mapping for this problem is any function f : X → S
taking the 466 games into predicted distributions of play. We define d(f, f ′) to be
the expected Kullback-Liebler divergence between the predicted distributions under
f and f ′, as in (2).
We define the naive mapping to predict the uniform distribution for every game:
fnaive(x) = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) for every x. Additionally, we consider three economic
models for this prediction task. The Poisson Cognitive Hierarchy Model (PCHM) of
Camerer et al. (2004) supposes that there is a distribution over players of differing
levels of sophistication: The level-0 player randomizes uniformly over his available
16This data includes a meta data-set of experimental data aggregated in Wright and Leyton-Brown
(2014) from six experimental game theory papers, in addition to Mechanical Turk data from new
experiments in Fudenberg and Liang (2019).
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actions, the level-1 player best responds to level-0 play (Stahl and Wilson, 1994, 1995;
Nagel, 1995); and for k ≥ 2, level-k players best respond to a perceived distribution
pk(h, τ) =
piτ (h)∑k−1
l=0 piτ (l)
∀ h ∈ N<k (9)
over (lower) opponent levels, where piτ is the Poisson distribution with rate parameter
τ . The parameter τ is the only free parameter of the model, and the naive mapping
is nested as τ = 0.
We also evaluate a model that we call logit level-1, which has a single free pa-
rameter λ ≥ 0. For each action ai, the predicted frequency with which ai is played
is
exp (λ · u(ai))∑3
i=1 exp (λ · u(ai))
.
This model nests prediction of uniform play (our naive rule) as λ = 0, and predicts a
degenerate distribution on the level-1 action when λ is sufficiently large.
Finally, we consider a model that we call logit PCHM (see e.g. Wright and Leyton-
Brown (2014)), which replaces the assumption of exact maximization in the PCHM
with a logit best response. This model has two free parameters: λ, τ ∈ R+. The
level-0 player chooses g0 = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3), as in the PCHM. Recursively define for
each k ≥ 1
vk(ai) =
k−1∑
h=0
pk(h, τ)
(
3∑
j=1
gh(j)u(ai, aj)
)
to be the expected payoff of action ai against a player whose type is distributed
according to pk(·, τ), where pk(h, τ) is as defined in (9), and define
gk(ai) =
exp(λ · vk(ai))∑3
j=1 exp(λ · vk(aj))
to be the distribution of level-k play. We aggregate across levels using a Poisson
distribution with rate parameter τ .
The models PCHM, logit level-1, and logit PCHM turn out to be 43.6%, 72.7%,
and 72.9% complete on the actual data. (Equivalently, their f ∗-discrepancies are
0.564, 0.273, and 0.271.) Thus, as observed in a related study by Wright and Leyton-
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Brown (2014), logit PCHM provides much better predictions of the distribution of
play than the baseline PCHM does. Perhaps surprisingly, we find that almost all
of this improvement is obtained by simply adding the logit parameter to the level-1
model, i.e. the further improvement from allowing for multiple levels of sophistication
is negligible.
The strong performance of logit level-1 for predicting initial play is consistent with
the earlier result of Fudenberg and Liang (2019) that the level-1 model provides a
good prediction of the modal action. It is harder to predict the full distribution of
play, so it is not obvious from the previous result that level-1 play with a logit noise
parameter would perform so well for prediction of the distribution of play. The strong
performance of level-1 for predicting modal play, combined with our new observation
that logit level-1 does a good job predicting the distribution of play, suggests that
initial play in many games is rather unstrategic.17
6.2 Restrictiveness
We turn now to evaluating the restrictiveness for these models. Compared to the
case of preferences over binary lotteries, economic theory provides very little in the
way of a priori restrictions on initial play.18 We thus define the permissible set FM
to include all mappings satisfying the following very weak conditions:
1. If an action is strictly dominated, then the frequency with which it is chosen
does not exceed 1/3.19
2. If an action is strictly dominant, then the frequency with which it is chosen is
at least 1/3.20
17In Fudenberg and Liang (2019), we found that modal play in some sorts of games is better
described by equilibrium notions than level-1. Since such regularities cannot be accommodated
by the logit level-1 model, these may explain the gap between the completeness of logit level-1
and full completeness. Costa-Gomes et al. (2001) find a sizable fraction of level-2 players in their
experimental data, which may further help to explain this gap.
18Classic game theory alone would suggest that dominant strategies have probability 1 and dom-
inated strategies have probability 0, but this is inconsistent with our data (and most experimental
data of play in games).
19In the actual data, the median strictly dominated action receives a frequency of 0.03 and the
max frequency is 0.35.
20In the actual data, the median strictly dominant action receives a frequency of 0.86 and the min
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For each of the PCHM, level-1(α), and logit PCHM, we generate 100 mappings
f from a uniform distribution µ over the set of permissible mappings FM, and eval-
uate the f -discrepancies with respect to these mappings.21 The distributions of f -
discrepancies are shown in the figure below.
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Figure 4: Distribution of f -discrepancies for the three models.
We find that logit level-1’s restrictiveness is 0.930, PCHM’s restrictiveness is 0.915,
and logit-PCHM’s restrictiveness is 0.822. Indeed, across all of these mappings and
models, the f -discrepancy is always at least 0.72. Equivalently, the completenesses
of these models across the simulated mappings is bounded above by 0.28. Since the
completeness of these models on the actual data ranged from 0.436 to 0.729, each of
these models is a much better predictor of the real data than of our hypothetical data
sets.
Simply comparing the completeness of the PCHM, 0.436, against the completeness
of CPT, 0.95, suggests that the PCHM is a “worse” model of initial play than CPT
is of certainty equivalents for lotteries. The contrast in their restrictivenesses (0.915
vs. 0.27) tells us that while PCHM does not capture all of the observed behaviors, it
more successfully rules out behaviors that we do not observe. These two perspectives
are depicted in Figure 5, where δf∗ is smaller for CPT than for PCHM, implying
that CPT better fits real data, but the distribution of f -discrepancies computed from
simulated data is concentrated at substantially larger values for PCHM, so it is a
frequency is 0.69.
21The set FM can be embedded in [0, 1]466×3, and so the uniform distribution over FM is well-
defined.
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more restrictive model.22
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Figure 5: Comparison of distribution of f -discrepancies, and δf∗ , across the two
applications.
Table 6.2 summarizes completeness and restrictiveness measures for all three models.
Completeness κ∗ N Restrictiveness r M
PCHM 0.436 21,393 0.915 100
(0.017) (0.003)
logit level-1 0.727 21,393 0.930 100
(0.015) (0.005)
logit PCHM 0.729 21,393 0.822 100
(0.014) (0.003)
Table 2: N is the number of observations in the data used to estimate κ∗. M is the
number of generated mappings from FM for computation of r.
From Table 6.2 we see that logit level-1 is more complete and also more restrictive
than the PCHM. Logit level-1 is also substantially more restrictive than logit PCHM,
at the cost of only a slight and statistically insignificant decrease in completeness.
These observations suggest that logit level-1 may be a preferable model to the PCHM
and logit PCHM for predicting initial play.23
22The figure naturally suggests composite measures such as r − δf∗ (the difference between the
average f -discrepancy computed on hypothetical data and the f∗-discrepancy computed on real
data), or the fraction of sampled f for which δf < δf∗ (as proposed in Section 3.4). By either of
these composite measures, PCHM is the “better” model, but we don’t know what the right composite
measure is.
23We suspect that PCHM and logit PCHM would outperform logit level-1 for predicting the
actions of subjects who played these games several times and learned from feedback. Note however
that the restrictiveness of the models would not change.
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7 Application to General Prediction Problems
In the two leading cases we have analyzed in the main text (Section 3.1), the function
d is derived from a primitive loss function l. We call the general property that permits
this decomposability.
Definition 4 (Decomposablity). Consider an arbitrary loss function l : F × X × Y
and define eP ∗(f) = EP ∗X [l(f, (X, Y ))] to be the expected loss of mapping f . For any
distribution P , let fP = minf∈F eP (f) denote the error-minimizing mapping under
that distribution. Say that the problem is decomposable if there exists a function
d : F × F → R such that
d(f, fP ) = eP (f)− eP (fP ) (10)
for every distribution P (with fixed marginal distribution P ∗X). That is, d(f, fP ) is
the difference between the error of mapping f and the error of the best mapping fP .
In general, prediction problems need not be decomposable. For example, suppose
the objective is to predict the conditional median, and the loss function is l(f, (x, y)) =
|y−f(x)| instead of squared loss. The expected error is then eP ∗(f) = EP ∗X |Y −f(X)|,
and the error-minimizing function f ∗ takes each x into the median value of Y at x.
We might want to use
d(f, f ′) = EP ∗X (|f(X)− f ′(X)|) (11)
as a measure of how different the predictions are under f and f ’, but this function does
not satisfy (10). For the absolute value loss function, there is in fact no function d :
F ×F → R that satisfies (10), because the difference in errors cannot be determined
from f and f ∗ alone, but depends on further properties of the conditional distribution
P ∗. (See Appendix D.2 for more details.)
When the problem is decomposable, as in the cases analyzed in the main text,
then our approach is applicable without change by setting d to be the function sat-
isfying (10). If the problem is not decomposable, we take d as a primitive, rather
than deriving it from the loss function l. The key concepts of f -discrepancies and
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restrictiveness are defined as they are in the main text, using this primitive d. What
we lose is the equivalence between the 1 − δf∗ and completeness κ∗, as described in
(3). One can report restrictiveness r (based on the primitive d) and completeness
κ∗ (based on the primitive l), understanding that there is no inherent relationship
between these concepts. Larger values of r and κ∗ can still be interpreted as more
restrictive and more complete models. A second alternative is to report 1−δf∗ instead
of completeness. Since δf∗ is derived from d, this second approach does not require
specification of a loss function at all. A new estimation procedure for δf∗ is needed,
however, as our approach in Section 4.2 makes use of the relationship δf∗ = 1 − κ∗.
We provide an alternative estimator for δf∗ in Appendix D.1 for this purpose.
8 Conclusion
When a theory fits the data well, it matters whether this is because the theory
captures important regularities in the data, or whether the theory is so flexible that
it can explain any behavior at all. We provide a practical, algorithmic approach for
evaluating the restrictiveness of a theory, and demonstrate that it reveals new insights
into models from two economic domains. The method is easily applied to models from
different domains.24
We conclude with a few final comments.
Why prefer restrictive theories? Completely unrestrictive theories, such as the
theory of utility maximization with unrestricted dependence of preferences on the
menu, can explain any data and so are vacuous. A theory is falsifiable if there is at
least one potential observation that it couldn’t explain. We can view restrictiveness
as a quantitative extension of the idea of falsifiability. Just as we prefer falsifiable
theories to vacuous one, we prefer theories that are more restrictive, though this is not
quite the same as “more falsifiable,” as it replaces the binary evaluation of whether
or not a data set refutes the theory with a quantitative evaluation of how theory
24For example, to measure the restrictiveness of rational aggregate demand, one could generate
random demand functions on a finite collection of budget sets, and compute the “distance” between
these functions and one that satisfies GARP. (We thank Tilman Bo¨rgers for this suggestion.)
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approximates the data.
Comparing the predictions of two models. A common practice for distinguish-
ing the empirical content of two models is to find instances where the models make
different predictions. We do not compare models here, although our approach can
be extended to compare the predictions of two models on the hypothetical data sets.
Specifically, instead of evaluating the discrepancy between the estimated model and
the best mapping, one could evaluate the discrepancy between the estimated models
from two parametric families. The average discrepancy in this case would then rep-
resent an average disagreement between the two models on hypothetical data. We
leave development of such concepts to future work.
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A Supplementary Material to Section 3.1
We now demonstrate the relationships in (1) and (2).
Mean-Squared Error. Suppose S = Y = R and the loss function is l(f, (x, y)) =
(y − f(x))2. The following decomposition is standard:
eP ∗ (f) := EP ∗
[
(Y − f (X))2]
= EP ∗
[
(Y − f ∗ (X))2]+ EP ∗ [(f (X)− f ∗ (X))2] = eP ∗ (f ∗) + d (f, f ∗)
Negative Log-Likelihood. Suppose S = ∆(Y) where Y is a finite set, and the loss
function is l(f, (x, y)) = − log f(y | x) for any mapping f : X → S. Then,
d(f, f ∗) =
∑
x∈X
f ∗ (x)
∑
y∈Y
f ∗ (y|x) log
(
f ∗ (y|x)
f (y|x)
)
= EP ∗ [log f ∗ (y|x)]− EP ∗ [log f (y|x)] = −eP ∗(f ∗) + eP ∗(f).
So eP ∗(f) = eP ∗(f
∗) + d(f, f ∗) as desired.
B Supplementary Material for Application 1
B.1 Loss Domain Results
Below we repeat the analysis of Section 5 for the 25 binary lotteries over the loss
domain from Bruhin et al. (2010). Again each lottery is denoted (z, z, p) where p
is the probability of the first prize. The prizes satisfy 0 ≥ z ≥ z. We evaluate a
3-parameter version of CPT indexed to θ = (β, γ, η) ∈ R+ × R+ × R+, where
fθ(z, z, p) = (1− w(1− p)) · v(z) + w(1− p) · v(z)
with v(z) = −((−z)β) and w(p) = (ηpγ)/(ηpγ + (1− p)γ).
We report below the equivalent of Table B.1 for this domain. The qualitative
findings are very similar to what we found in the main text. In particular, CPT’s
restrictiveness is 0.35 (compare to our previous estimate of 0.29), so CPT is fairly
unrestrictive on this set of loteries as well. Additionally, we again find that CPT-
(η, γ) is simultaneously more complete and more restrictive than CPT-(β, γ), and
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that augmenting CPT-(η, γ) with the utility curvature parameter β only marginally
improves completeness while substantially decreasing restrictiveness.
Free Parameters Completeness κ∗ N Restrictiveness r M
β, γ, η 0.86 8906 0.35 100
(0.05) (0.03)
β, γ 0.65 8906 0.41 100
(0.05) (0.03)
γ, η 0.85 8906 0.45 100
(0.05) (0.01)
β 0.09 8906 0.63 100
(0.08) (0.03)
Table 3: Completeness and restrictiveness are reported for the new data set. N is
the number of observations in the data used to estimate κ∗. M is the number of
generated mappings from FM for computation of r.
B.2 Different Specification for the Permissible Set
Consider the alternative permissible set of mappings consisting of all functions f :
X → R satisfying f(z, z, p) ∈ [z, z]. We sample 100 times from a uniform distribution
over this set and report the distribution of f -discrepancies in the figure below:
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The average discrepancy, 0.35, tells us that the model is more restrictive on this
expanded domain of mappings, but not substantially so.25
25Even though the errors are substantially higher than when we require the permissible mappings
to respect FOSD, the estimated restrictiveness is almost the same because the naive error also
increases. Specifically, the mean naive error is 343.32 (compared to 178.73 under the original FM ),
while the mean CPT error is 110.73 (compared to 58.21 under the original FM ).
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B.3 Parameter Estimates
We report below the estimated parameters for each of the models that we consider.
In the first column, we report the estimated parameters on the actual data. In the
second, we report the average parameter estimates for across our generated mappings.
Free Parameters Real Data Generated Mappings
α, η, γ (1.02,0.6,0.5) (1.08,0.71,0.41)
α, γ (0.98,1.01,0.50) (1.03,0.33)
η, γ (0.70,0.50) (1.08,0.29)
α 0.98 1.03
Real Data Generated Mappings
PCHM τ = 0.5 τ = 0.1
logit level-1 λ = 0.02 λ = 0.0018
logit PCHM (τ, λ) = (1.4, 0.11) (τ, λ) = (1.05, 0.02)
B.4 Three-Outcome Lotteries
We use a set of 18 three-outcome lotteries from Bernheim and Sprenger (2020) (listed
below) and evaluate the restrictiveness of Cumulative Prospect Theory for predicting
certainty equivalents for these lotteries.
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z1 z2 z3 p1 p2 p3
34 24 18 0.1 0.3 0.6
34 24 18 0.4 0.3 0.3
34 24 18 0.6 0.3 0.1
32 24 18 0.1 0.3 0.6
32 24 18 0.4 0.3 0.3
32 24 18 0.6 0.3 0.1
30 24 18 0.1 0.3 0.6
30 24 18 0.4 0.3 0.3
30 24 18 0.6 0.3 0.1
24 23 18 0.3 0.1 0.6
24 23 18 0.3 0.4 0.3
24 23 18 0.3 0.6 0.1
24 21 18 0.3 0.1 0.6
24 21 18 0.3 0.4 0.3
24 21 18 0.3 0.6 0.1
24 19 18 0.3 0.1 0.6
24 19 18 0.3 0.4 0.3
24 19 18 0.3 0.6 0.1
The prizes satisfy z1 > z2 > z3 ≥ 0. On the domain of three-outcome lotteries, CPT
predicts
v(z1) + w(p2 + p3)(v(z2)− v(z1)) + w(p3)(v(z3)− v(z2))
for each lottery (z1, z2, z3; p1, p2, p3) (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). We use the
functional forms for v and w given in the main text.
A predictive mapping f is a map from these 18 lotteries into average certainty
equivalents. The set of permissible mappings FM is again defined to satisfy: (1)
each certainty equivalent has to be in the range of the lottery outcomes, and (2) if
a lottery first-order stochastically dominates another, then its certainty equivalent
must be higher. We generate 100 random mappings from a uniform distribution over
mappings satisfying these properties.
Below, we compare the distribution of f -discrepancies from Figure 6 with the
distribution of f -discrepancies that we find for these three-outcome lotteries.
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Figure 6: Left: Binary lotteries; Right: Three-outcome lotteries
The restrictiveness of CPT on this set of three-outcome lotteries is 0.496, with a
standard error of 0.018. Thus CPT is about 1.5 times as restrictive as a model of
certainty equivalents for three-outcome lotteries than as a model of certainty equiv-
alents for binary lotteries. Besides imposing FOSD, CPT imposes rank dependence
on the domain of three-outcome lotteries. (This restriction does not apply for binary
lotteries.) This may explain part of the increase in restrictiveness. Even this higher
restrictiveness, however, is substantially less than what we find for models of initial
play.
B.5 Heterogeneous Risk Preferences
Our analysis in the main text considered representative agent models. In some cases,
the analyst may have auxiliary data on the subjects that can be used to improve
predictions. We show now how completeness and restrictiveness can be evaluated in
this case.
Specifically, we return to our first application and group subjects into three clusters
identified by Bruhin et al. (2010). We fit CPT for each cluster, allowing parameter
values to vary across groups. Table B.5 reports completeness measures cluster by
cluster.
The performance of the naive expected value rule, the best achievable performance,
and the performance of CPT, all vary substantially across clusters. For example,
the behavior of subjects in cluster 1 is roughly consistent with expected value (the
error of the naive rule is 39.90), while the behavior of subjects in cluster 2 departs
substantially from this benchmark (the error of the naive rule is 99.94). The best
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Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3
Naive 39.90 150.10 99.94
(4.98) (7.24) (7.97)
CPT 30.74 43.87 69.62
(7.25) ( 4.72) (8.50)
Best Achievable Error 29.59 36.30 67.05
(7.36) (3.34) (8.02)
Completeness 0.98 0.88 0.92
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
N 674 1144 2641
Table 4: Completeness measures for each of three subject clusters.
achievable prediction for these groups of subjects is also very different (ranging from
29.59 to 67.05), as is the completeness of CPT (ranging from 30.74 to 69.62).
The average completeness, weighted by proportion of observations in each cluster,
is 0.91, which is very close to what we found for the representative agent model. This
may seem surprising at first, since allowing for parameters to vary across subjects
improves the accuracy of predictions. But the best mapping from the extended feature
space X ′ = X × {1, 2, 3} to Y is more predictive than the best mapping considered
previously. Thus what we find is that the completeness of CPT with three clusters,
relative to the best three-cluster mapping, is comparable to the completeness of the
representative-agent version of CPT, relative to the best representative-agent mapping.
Similarly, when measuring restrictiveness, we extend the set of permissible map-
pings to the domain X ′. Each generated pattern of behavior is thus a triple (f1, f2, f3)
of mappings from the original FM. We ask how well these tuples can be approximated
using mappings (g1, g2, g3) from CPT. It is straightforward to see that the restrictive-
ness of the three-cluster CPT is identical to the restrictiveness of the representative-
agent model.26
26Note that this is true for any number of exogenously specified clusters.
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C Estimation of Completeness κ∗
C.1 Preliminary Definitions
We now introduce some definitions and notation that will be useful in the derivation
of the asymptotic distribution of the CV-based completeness estimator.
C.1.1 Finite-Sample Out-of-Sample Error
Let ZN := (Zi)
N
i=1 be a random sample of observations in a given data set, and
let ZN+1 ∼ P ∗ denote a random variable with the same distribution P ∗ that is
independent of ZN . For a given data set ZN and a given model F , we define the
conditional out-of-sample error (given data set ZN) as
eF (ZN) := E
[
l
(
fˆZN , ZN+1
)∣∣∣ZN] ,
where fˆZN ∈ F is an estimator, or an algorithm, that selects a mapping fˆZN within the
model F based on data ZN . We also define the out-of-sample error, with expectation
taken over different possible data sets ZN , as
eF ,N := E [eF (ZN)] .
From the definition of the K-fold cross-validation estimator, it can be easily
shown that E [CV (F)] = eF ,K−1
K
N . As a result, the asymptotic distribution of
CV (F) − eF ,K−1
K
N has been studied in the statistics and machine learning litera-
ture. Our analysis below will be based on the results in Austern and Zhou (2020) on
the asymptotic distribution of CV (F)− eF ,K−1
K
N .
C.1.2 Joint Parametrization of FΘ and FM
Recall that the model FΘ is parametrized by θ ∈ Θ, and fθ denotes a generic function
in FΘ. Motivated by the applications in this paper, we assume that FM can be
smoothly parameterized by a finite-dimensional parameter β ∈ BM ⊆ RdM and use
the notation f[β] ∈ FM to denote a generic function in FM. Since by assumption
f ∗ ∈ FM, we can define a parameter β∗ to represent it, i.e. f[β∗] = f ∗.
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For arbitrary parameters θ and β, write
lΘ (θ, Zi) := l (fθ, Zi) , lB (β, Zi) := l
(
f[β], Zi
)
.
We define the estimation mappings in FΘ and FM by
θˆ (ZN) := arg min
θ∈Θ
1
N
∑
lΘ (θ, Zi) ,
βˆ (ZN) := arg min
β∈BM
1
N
∑
lB (β, Zi) .
Let α :=
(
θ
′
, β
′)′
denote the concatenation of the parameters θ ∈ FΘ and β ∈ BM,
α∗ :=
(
θ∗
′
, β∗
′)′
to be the parameters associated with the best mappings in FΘ and
FM, and also define
αˆ (ZN) :=
(
θˆ
′
(ZN) , βˆ
′
(ZN)
)′
= arg min
θ∈Θ,β∈BM
1
N
N∑
i=1
[lΘ (θ, Zi) + lB (β, Zi)] ,
to be an estimator for α∗. Finally, define
∆l (θ, β;Zi) := l (fθ, Zi)− l
(
f[β], Zi
)
= lΘ (θ, Zi)− lB (β, Zi) .
C.2 Assumptions and Lemmas Based on Austern and Zhou
(2020)
Assumption 3 (Conditions for Asymptotics of CV Estimator). 1. lΘ (θ, z) and lB (β, z)
are twice differentiable and strictly convex in θ and β.
2. E [supθ∈Θ l4Θ (θ, Zi)] <∞ and E
[
supβ∈B l
4
B (β, Zi)
]
<∞.
3. There exist open neighborhoods Oθ∗ and Oβ∗ of θ∗and β∗ in Θ and B such that
(a) E
[
supθ∈Oθ∗ ‖∇θlΘ (θ, Zi)‖
16] <∞, E [supβ∈Oβ∗ ‖∇βlB (β, Zi)‖16] <∞.
(b) E
[
supθ∈Oθ∗ ‖∇2θlΘ (θ, Zi)‖
16
]
<∞, E
[
supβ∈Oβ∗ ‖∇βlB (β, Zi)‖
16
]
<∞.
(c) there exists c > 0 such that λmin (∇2θlΘ (θ, Zi)) ≥ c, λmin
(∇2βlB (β, Zi)) ≥ c
a.s. uniformly on Oθ∗ and Oβ∗.
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Lemma C.1 (Application of Proposition 5 of Austern and Zhou, 2020). Under As-
sumption 3:
√
N
[
CV (FΘ)− CV (FM)−
(
eFΘ,K−1K N − eFM,K−1K N
)]
d−→ N (0,Var (∆l (fθ∗ , f ∗;Zi))) .
Proof. Proposition 5 of Austern and Zhou (2020) establishes the asymptotic normal-
ity of cross-validation risk estimator and its asymptotic variance under parametric
settings where the loss function used for training is the same as the loss function used
for evaluation. Applying Proposition 5 of Austern and Zhou (2020) under Assumption
3 to θ, β and α = (θ, β), we obtain:
√
N
(
CV (FΘ)− eFΘ,K−1K N
)
d−→ N (0,Var (l (fθ∗ , Zi))) ,
√
N
(
CV (FM)− eFM,K−1K N
)
d−→ N (0,Var (l (f ∗, Zi))) ,
√
N
(
CV (FΘ) + CV (FM)− eFΘ,K−1K N − eFM,K−1K N
)
d−→ N (0,Var (l (fθ∗ , Zi) + l (f ∗, Zi))) .
Using the equality Var (X + Y )+Var (X − Y ) = 2Var (X)+2Var (Y ), we then deduce
that
√
N
[
CV (FΘ)− CV (FM)−
(
eFΘ,K−1K N − eFM,K−1K N
)]
d−→ N (0,Var (∆l (fθ∗ , f ∗;Zi))) .
Lemma C.2 (Application of Proposition 1 of Austern and Zhou, 2020). Under As-
sumption 3,
σˆ2∆
p−→ Var (∆l (fθ∗ , f ∗;Zi)) .
Proof. Applying Proposition 1 of Austern and Zhou (2020) under Assumption 3 to
θ, β and α = (θ, β):
σˆ2CV (FΘ) :=
1
K
K∑
k=1
1
JN − 1
∑
k(i)=k
l (fθˆ−k , Zi)− 1JN ∑
k(j)=k
l (fθˆ−k , Zj)
2
p−→ Var (l (fθ∗ , Zi)) .
and
σˆ2CV (FM) :=
1
K
K∑
k=1
1
JN − 1
∑
k(i)=k
l (f[βˆ−k], Zi)− 1JN ∑
k(j)=k
l
(
f[βˆ−k], Zj
)2
p−→ Var (l (f ∗, Zi)) .
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and
σˆ2CV (FΘ)+CV (FM)
:=
1
K
K∑
k=1
1
JN − 1 ·
∑
k(i)=kl (fθˆ−k , Zi) + l (f[βˆ−k], Zi)− 1JN ∑
k(j)=k
[
l
(
f[βˆ−k], Zj
)
+ l (fθˆ−k , Zi)
]2
p−→Var (l (fθ∗ , Zi) + l (f ∗, Zi)) ,
Hence:
σˆ2∆ = 2σˆ
2
CV (FΘ) + 2σˆ
2
CV (FM) − σˆ2CV (FΘ)+CV (FM)
p−→ 2Var (l (fθ∗ , Zi)) + 2Var (l (f ∗, Zi))− 2Var (l (fθ∗,Zi) + l (f ∗, Zi))
= Var (∆l (fθ∗ , f
∗;Zi))
C.3 Proof of Asymptotic Normality of κˆ∗
Lemma C.1 characterizes the limit distribution of
√
N
[
CV (FΘ)− CV (FM)−
(
eFΘ,K−1K N − eFM,K−1K N
)]
which we now show is also the limit distribution of
√
N [CV (FΘ)− CV (FM)− (eFΘ − eFM)] .
To see this, notice that
eΘ,K−1
K
N − eFΘ = E
[
lΘ
(
θˆ−k(i), Zi
)
− lΘ (θ∗, Zi)
]
= E
[
∇lΘ (θ∗, Zi) ·
(
θˆ−k(i) − θ∗
)
+
(
θˆ−k(i) − θ∗
)′
∇2lΘ
(
θ˜, Zi
)
·
(
θˆ−k(i) − θ∗
)]
= 0 + E
[(
θˆ−k(i) − θ∗
)′
∇2lΘ
(
θ˜, Zi
)
·
(
θˆ−k(i) − θ∗
)]
=
1
N − JN E
[√
N − JN
(
θˆ−k(i) − θ∗
)′
∇2lΘ
(
θ˜, Zi
)
·
√
N − JN
(
θˆ−k(i) − θ∗
)]
= c
1
N − JN + o
(
1
N − JN
)
= c
K
K − 1 ·
1
N
+ o
(
1
N
)
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since JN = N/K, and hence
√
N
(
eΘ,K−1
K
N − eΘ
)
= op (1) .
Similarly,
√
N
(
eFM,K−1K N − eFM
)
= op (1).
Hence:
√
N [CV (FΘ)− CV (FM)− (eFΘ − eFM)] d−→ N (0,Var (∆l (fθ∗ , f ∗;Zi))) .
Then, by Lemma C.2, Assumption 2 and the continuous mapping theorem, we have
√
N (κˆ∗ − κ∗)
σˆκˆ∗
d−→ N (0, 1) .
D Supplementary Material to Section 7
D.1 Alternative Estimator of f ∗-Discrepancy
We now discuss an alternative estimator for f ∗-discrepancy
δf∗ =
d(fθ∗ , f
∗)
d(fnaive, f ∗)
when the decomposability condition (10) does not hold.
We again work with the parameterization of FM via β ∈ B. Suppose that we have
access to an estimator βˆ of β∗ that is consistent and asymptotically normal:
√
N
(
βˆ − β∗
)
d−→ N (0,Σ) .
Given that θ∗ = arg minθ∈Θ d
(
fθ, f[β∗]
)
, we can construct an estimator of θ∗ as
θˆ := θˆ
(
βˆ
)
:= arg min
θ∈Θ
d
(
fθ, f[βˆ]
)
,
with which we can obtain the following estimator of δf∗
δˆf∗ :=
d
(
fθˆ(βˆ), f[βˆ]
)
d
(
fnaive, f[βˆ]
) = minθ∈Θ d
(
fθ, f[βˆ]
)
d
(
fnaive, f[βˆ]
) .
We impose the following joint assumption on the dissimilarity function d and the
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parameterization of FΘ and FM.
Assumption 4. Define d (θ, β) := d
(
fθ, f[β]
)
. Suppose that:
(a) d is joint differentiable with respect to (θ, β) in a neighborhood of (θ∗, β∗).
(b) ψ∗ := ∇β d
(
θˆ (β) , β
)∣∣∣
β=β∗
6= 0.
The requirements in Assumption 4 are very weak. Part (a) is a standard differ-
entiability condition, which should be satisfied in most applications. For (b), notice
that by the Envelope Theorem,
ψ∗ := ∇βd
(
θˆ (β∗) , β∗
)
=
∂
∂β
d (θ∗, β∗)
Hence, ψ∗ 6= 0 essentially requires that the dissimilarity d(fθ∗ , f) between fθ∗ and f
as f varies locally in a neighborhood of f ∗.
By the Delta Method,
√
N
(
min
θ∈Θ
d
(
fθ, f[βˆ]
)
−min
θ∈Θ
d
(
fθ, f[β∗]
))
=
√
N
(
d
(
θˆ
(
βˆ
)
, βˆ
)
− d
(
θˆ (β∗) , β∗
))
d−→ N
(
0, ψ∗
′
Σψ∗
)
.
implying that
√
N
(
δˆf∗ − δf∗
)
d−→ N
(
0,
ψ∗
′
Σψ∗
d2 (fnaive, f ∗)
)
.
The standard error can be estimated via bootstrapping.
D.2 Example: Lack of Decomposability
Consider a setting where X is degenerate, i.e., X is a singleton, so that the joint
distribution P is completely characterized by the distribution of Y . Furthermore, let
Y := [0, 1].
If f ∗ := med (Y ) ∈ S := Y = [0, 1], then a mapping f : X → S is just a number
in [0, 1]. When the loss function is the absolute deviation l (f, y) := |y − f | , and the
error function is mean absolute deviation eP ∗ (f) := EP ∗ [|Y − f |] , the true median
f ∗ minimizes the error, i.e. f ∗ ∈ arg minf∈[0,1] eP ∗ (f) . However, it is not true that
|f − f ∗| = eP ∗ (f)− eP ∗ (f ∗) for any f ∈ [0, 1]. To see this, suppose that Y ∼ U [0, 1]
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under P ∗. Then f ∗ = 0.5 and eP ∗ (f ∗) = 0.25. However, for f = 0.4, we have
eP ∗ (f) = 0.26. but |f − f ∗| = 0.1 6= 0.01 = eP ∗ (f)− eP ∗ (f ∗) .
Moreover, there is no function d : [0, 1]2 → [0, 1] such that decomposability (10)
holds, which would require that d (f, fP ) = eP (f)− eP (fP ) for any distribution P of
Y supported on [0, 1]. To see this, suppose that Y ∼ U [0, 1] under P1, we have
eP1 (f)− eP1 (fP1) = (f − 0.5)2 = (f − fP1)2 , ∀f ∈ [0, 1].
However, supposing that, under P2, the probability density function of Y is given by
2y for y ∈ [0, 1], we have fP2 =
√
2/2 and eP2 (fP2) = (2−
√
2)/3 but
eP2 (f)− eP2 (fP2) =
1
3
(
2f 3 − 3f 2 +
√
2
)
6= (f − fP2)2 .
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